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This paper explores the effect of fiscal incentives for R&D on innovation. Spain is considered one 
of the most generous countries in the OECD in fiscal treatment of R&D, yet our data reveal that 
tax incentives are little known and, especially, seldom used by firms. Restricting our empirical 
analysis to those firms that do report knowing about such incentives, we investigate the average 
effect of tax incentives on innovation, using both nonparametric methods (matching estimators) 
and parametric methods (Heckman’s two-step selection model with instrumental variables). First, 
we find that large firms, especially those that implement innovations, are more likely to use the tax 
incentives, while small and medium enterprises (SMEs) encounter some obstacles to using them. 
Secondly, the average effect of the policy is positive, but significant only in large firms. Our main 
conclusion is that tax incentives increase innovative activities by large and high-tech sector firms, 
but may be used only randomly by SMEs.  
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I. Introduction 
Private firms spend less on R&D than is socially optimal because the presence of externalities 
creates a gap between private and public profitability (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959). In most 
OECD countries governments try to solve this problem through various measures, such as 
subsidies or fiscal incentives for R&D, in order to stimulate innovation. The effectiveness of 
these instruments depends on each country’s fiscal system and the purposes of its programs 
(European Commission 2003).  
Spain is considered the most generous country in the OECD in tax treatment of R&D 
(Warda 2001 and 2002). Fiscal benefits act either on the tax base (free depreciation) or on the 
corporate income tax liability (tax credits for R&D and technological innovation) and apply to 
all firms that carry out R&D activities, independently of the success or failure of the project.3 
Given these tax incentives, the price of R&D is minor (Marra 2004; Corchuelo 2006), so these 
instruments should in theory stimulate innovation activities and correct for suboptimal R&D 
funding in firms.  
However, empirical evidence reveals that these generous tax incentives are rarely used 
by Spanish firms (Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros 2008). Accordingly, the main goal of this paper 
is to evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D in Spain. The success of this tax 
policy is based on the government’s ability to design it and on the use of firms’ expected profit. 
Therefore, it is very important to understand the design of the tax benefits and the characteristics 
of the firms that use them. This means that the variable that explains the financial-economic 
profitability of the incentives (generally measured by the marginal effective tax credit, B-index 
or cost of R&D capital) is endogenous. We assume also that there may be a selection problem—
that is, the design of the tax incentives may make some kinds of firms more likely to use them 
than others.  
Empirical studies that have analyzed the effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
3 Fiscal incentives for R&D in Spain are governed by articles 11.2, 16.4, 35, 36 and 40.3 of the Revised Text of 
the Corporate Income Tax Law (RD-L 4/2004). 
 
usually employed parametric techniques of econometric estimation. This paper uses a 
nonparametric approach (matching methods) to take into account the problems of selection and 
endogeneity. We also present a parametric approach (Heckman’s two-step selection model) to 
compare our results with those from the standard approach.  
The matching approach has been widely used in the evaluation of public policies, 
especially policies oriented to the labour market (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997; Heckman, 
LaLonde and Smith 1999; Lechner 2002; Dehejia and Wahba 1999 and 2002; Hotz et al. 2006). 
In the evaluation of innovation policies, this method has been used, essentially, to analyse the 
effects of direct subsidies on R&D activities; little research has addressed the effects of tax 
incentives (Czarnitzki et al. 2004; Heijs et al. 2006). Also, only Marra (2004) and Corchuelo 
(2006) have studied the effects of tax incentives on innovation in Spain.   
Our data come from the Spanish Business Strategy Survey at the firm level. Since 2001, 
this survey has included some questions related to firms’ knowledge and use of tax incentives 
for R&D. Our analysis is focused on a single year, 2002, because of problems with answers to 
some of the questions in 2001, although we use variables covering the period 1998-2002.  
Our results are presented in three parts. First, we isolate the factors that affect the 
probability that a firm will take advantage of tax incentives for R&D; second, we estimate the 
average effect of the tax policy on user and non-user firms, using a nonparametric approach 
(matching estimators); and third, we analyse the effects of tax benefits on R&D technological 
effort, using a parametric approach (Heckman’s two-step selection model) in order to compare 
the results with those from the nonparametric method.  
In summary, we find that firms with higher capacity for innovation, with a stable 
financial position, and that have also received R&D subsidies (especially SMEs) are 
more likely to take advantage of the tax benefits. However, SMEs encounter important 
obstacles to using them. Otherwise, on average, tax policy fosters technological effort, 
but the increase is only significant in large firms. Results from the Heckman’s selection 
model confirm that tax policy has a significant and great effect only in large firms and 
 
firms that belong to high-technological intensity sectors and it is not significant for 
SMEs which they do not suffer selection problem. 
We conclude that tax incentives for R&D are randomly distributed in SMEs because 
those firms are not aware of their benefits. In contrast, large firms accept the minor cost that 
fiscal incentives take for granted, and the policy has a positive effect on their technological 
effort.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature 
evaluating innovation policies, Section 3 introduces the data sources, and Section 4 
discusses the methods used for the empirical assessment of the effects. The empirical 
results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature review 
There is abundant empirical literature related to the effects of financial public policies—
either subsidies or tax incentives—on R&D spending. Studies of tax incentives aim 
mainly at measuring the additional private R&D spending and the cost-effectiveness of 
the incentives, that is, whether the additional R&D spending is greater than the 
government’s tax revenue losses.  
Most studies have used a micro-econometric framework because more and better 
micro-data are available, and most studies have focused on the American and Canadian 
economies (Hall and Van Reenen 2000). Nevertheless, there are also studies focused on 
other countries.4 Studies using a macro-econometric framework are scarce but not 
irrelevant, since macro-data allow capturing the indirect effects caused by the 
incentives, for example, the spillover effects of innovation between countries (Guellec 
and van Pottlesberghe 2003; Falk 2004), or other macro-economic factors that affect 
R&D decisions (the culture of innovation, the fiscal system, etc.) (Bloom et al. 2002).  
 
The methodology used in the literature on R&D fiscal incentives combines event 
studies comparing behaviour before and after a change in the policy (Collins 1983); 
questionnaire surveys and interviews attempting to determine how individual firms 
respond to a policy change (Mansfield 1986); and econometric estimation using two 
types of parametric methods: impact models (Berger 1993) in which a binary variable 
shows the impact of the tax incentive, and demand models (Hall 1993) that directly 
obtain the price-elasticity of R&D investment. Although results are mixed, the most 
recent studies confirm the effectiveness (Hall and van Reenen 2000)5 and cost-
effectiveness (Finance Department of Canada 1998) of tax incentives for R&D. In 
Spain, there is little evidence of the impact of this tax policy, except for studies by 
Marra (2004), who concludes that tax incentives affect the firm cost structure and 
improve the private demand for R&D, and Corchuelo (2006), who finds that incentives 
increase the probability of innovation and R&D effort. 
Recently, parametric approaches have been combined with nonparametric ones 
in the evaluation of public policies. This approach has been widely used to determine 
whether R&D direct subsidies complement or crowd out private spending on R&D. In 
these studies, the recent concern about endogeneity and selection problems has led 
researchers to identify patterns in the distribution of public support and to estimate 
counterfactual status (Herrera and Heijs 2006). 
 Using a matching approach, Czarnitzki (2001), Fier (2002) and Almus and 
Czarnitzki (2003) have concluded that, in Germany, R&D subsidies do not fully crowd 
out private financing. Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), using data from German innovative 
firms in the service sector, obtain evidence of additionality as well, and argue that the 
reason may be that the service sector experiences more problems in protecting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4  Some examples: Lattimore (1997) in Australia, Asmussen and Berriot (1997) and Mulkay and Mairesse 
(2003) in France, van Pottlesberghe et al. (2003) in Belgium, and Parisi and Sembenelli (2003) in Italy.   
5  In general, the median of the elasticity is  –0.85, and the average is  -0.81 (European Commission 2003). 
 
intellectual property than does the manufacturing sector. In France, Duguet (2004), 
working with a panel of innovative manufacturing and service sector firms and 
controlling for past R&D subsidies, shows that on average, public funds add to private 
funds rather than crowding them out. However, there might be a partial crowding-out 
effect if the amount of the subsidies could be taken into account. In Sweden, Lööf and 
Hesmati (2005), using data on 770 manufacturing and service firms that conduct R&D, 
also find additionality, especially in SMEs. In Finland, Czarnitzki and Ebersberger 
(2006) find that innovation input increases with the reception of public subsidies, so 
they reject a full crowding out of private by public financing. Innovation activities are 
also more equally distributed as a consequence of public subsidies. In Spain, Herrera 
and Heijs (2006) show that R&D subsidies have increased R&D intensity, especially 
among firms with less chance of obtaining public funding. González and Pazó (2006), 
using a bias-corrected matching estimator and controlling (as in Duguet, 2004) for past 
R&D subsidies, reject either full or partial crowding out of private financing by R&D 
subsidies and conclude that some firms (especially SMEs and firms with medium-low 
technological intensity) would have not developed R&D activities in the absence of 
R&D subsidies. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Herrera (2004), using this 
approach, observe additionality for subsidies not only in R&D input but also in output 
(patenting behaviour). 
Other studies combine parametric and nonparametric techniques to evaluate 
public funding policy. Kaiser (2004) analyses the effect of public support on firms’ 
R&D intensity using Heckman’s two-step selection model and nearest neighbour 
matching estimator. He finds no evidence of crowding out, although he has some doubts 
about this conclusion because of some problems in the data. Görg and Strolb (2005), 
working with a sample of Irish plants and using parametric (DID) and nonparametric 
estimations (with Caliper matching estimator), find that medium-sized and small 
 
domestic plants increase their R&D spending as a consequence of the subsidies 
received, whereas large plants do not. For foreign-owned plants, the authors do not find 
complementary or substitution effects, independently of their size. In Belgium, Aerts 
and Czarnitzki (2006), combining matching estimators and instrumental variables and 
taking into account the amount of subsidy received rule out full crowding out of private 
R&D spending. In Spain, Duch et al. (2006), who use the matching and OLS approach 
to analyze the impact of various types of R&D subsidies received by Catalonian 
manufacturing and service sector firms, find improvements not only in their returns but 
also in the evolution of their business practices and their added value. Czarnitzki and 
Licht (2005) combine both approaches to study the input and output additionality of 
R&D subsidies in eastern and western Germany. They include in the sample firms that 
do not conduct R&D, in order to consider the inducement effect of the subsidies. They 
observe complementary effects and reject the existence of a crowding-out effect.  
  Recently, an increasing number of studies have used both approaches to 
analyse the effects of R&D subsidies on firms’ R&D co-operation. Czarnitzki and Fier 
(2003) in Germany, Ebersberger and Lehtoranta (2005) in Finland, and Czarnitzki, 
Ebersberger and Fier (2006) in Finland and Germany find that funding for R&D co-
operation increases the output of patents. In Spain, Busom and Fernández-Rivas (2005) 
and Busom (2006), using a sample of innovative manufacturing firms, find that the type 
of R&D collaboration chosen is associated with various firm characteristics and that 
R&D subsidies cause a behavioural change in firms’ R&D strategic partnerships. 
Similar conclusions have been obtained in studies that have used only parametric 
methods of estimation to evaluate the relationship between R&D subsidies and firms’ 
R&D activities. The exceptions are Wallsten (2000), who (using simultaneous equation 
models) finds full crowding out of private R&D spending in firms benefiting from the 
U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme; Busom (2000), in Spain, 
 
who (using Heckman’s two-step selection model) rejects full crowding out of private 
funds but finds partial crowding out for 30 percent of the firms; Toivanen and Niininem 
(2000), in Finland, who show that the positive effect of R&D subsidies disappears in 
firms with higher cash-flow; and Suetens (2002), in Belgium, who (using instrumental 
variables) finds no significant effects of R&D subsidies. The rest of the studies we have 
analysed rule out full (or partial) crowding-out effects on innovation inputs or outputs. 
In a micro-econometric framework, these include Czarnitzki and Fier (2001) in 
Germany (using OLS and logit models); Lach (2002) in Israel (using various types of 
estimators); Hanel (2003) in Canada (using univariate and two-stage logit models); 
Lehto (2000), working with plant data, and Ali-Yrkkö (2005 a, b), both in Finland 
(using instrumental variable approaches); Hussinger (2006) in Germany (using two-step 
parametric and semiparametric models); González et al. (2005) in Spain (using 
simultaneous equation models with thresholds and instrumental variables); and Gelabert 
et al. (2006) in Spain (using instrumental variables and Heckman’s two-step selection 
model). In a macro-econometric framework, Wolff and Reinthaler (2005), working with 
a panel of OECD countries (using instrumental variables), also find no crowding-out 
effects.  
To summarize, the majority of studies that have used only parametric or only 
nonparametric approaches or both, controlling for the endogeneity of R&D subsidies 
and sample selection problems, have rejected full crowding-out effects. There is 
evidence that the increases in innovation input translate into increased innovation 
output, as well.  
In contrast, there are only two papers, to our knowledge, that have analysed the 
effects of tax incentives on R&D using a nonparametric approach. In Canada, 
Czarnitzki et al. (2004), using data for 1999, show that tax credits increase a firm’s 
probability of developing new products in domestic and foreign markets; they infer that 
 
firms perform more R&D activities because of the tax incentives. In Spain, Heijs et al. 
(2006) use the propensity score matching method to analyse the effect of tax incentives 
on Spanish manufacturing firms. They reject a crowding-out effect, although they 
conclude that fiscal incentives do not stimulate additional R&D investment. 
III. Spanish data 
We use data provided by the SEPI Foundation on behalf of the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry, Tourism and Trade.6 This survey contains data from 1990 to 2002 on 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees, which are questioned about their 
strategies in the short and long run, including their R&D decisions. Since 2001, this 
survey has included some questions about the knowledge and use of tax incentives for 
R&D that allow us to distinguish between firms that merely are aware of these 
incentives and firms that actually use them. Because of some problems with answers in 
2001, our research refers to the year 2002, although we measure some variables for the 
period 1998 to 2002. Our final sample includes 1708 observations at the firm level. 
Tables 1 and 2 analyse the knowledge and use of tax incentives by firms of 
various sizes7 and sectors.8 Only a little more than half of the firms in the full sample 
are aware of the incentives; awareness is especially low among SMEs and in industries 
with medium-low technological intensity. And of those that know about the R&D tax 
credit, fewer than half use it. If we consider only firms that conducted R&D in 2002, the 
percentages increase, especially of SMEs and firms with medium-low technological 
intensity that report knowing about the tax incentives, but still, very few firms report 
using them. Finally, Table 3 analyses the average R&D technological effort (R&D 
spending over sales), which, in general, is higher in those firms that know about and, 
                                                          
6  See Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1999) and www.funep.es for the survey’s design and elaboration. 
7  We sort by sizes because of the special characteristics of the sample. Large firms (more than 200 employees) 
were fully selected, while small ones (>10 and ≤ 200 employees) were randomly selected. 
8  Sectors are classified into high-medium and medium-low technological intensity according to 
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especially, that use the tax incentives. Whether there is a causal connection is something 
to confirm by empirical study. 
[Table 1] 
 [Table 2] 
 [Table 3] 
 
IV. Methods 
We examine the average treatment effects of R&D tax incentives on firms’ R&D technological 
effort using two different approaches: matching estimators and Heckman’s two-step selection 
model.  
The matching approach is used when the data exhibit a selection bias. If R&D tax 
incentives were randomly distributed among firms, then we could simply compare the average 
R&D technological effort of the user and non-user firms in order to obtain the treatment effect.9 
But fiscal incentives for R&D are not granted randomly; they depend on the government’s 
design. Moreover, firms at least are partly self-select into the treatment and their decisions 
whether or not to take advantage of these incentives may be related to the expected benefits. 
The matching method attempts to emulate an experiment where tax incentives are distributed 
randomly by comparing the outcomes of pairs of firms that are very similar in several 
characteristics. We can then compare the average R&D technological effort of the group of user 
firms with the group of matched similar non-user firms. The main advantage of this approach is 
that we need assume neither functional form nor distribution of the measurement error term. But 
this method also has some drawbacks: it allows us only to verify heterogeneity between the 
treated and not-treated firms (Czarnitzki et al. 2004); it assumes that selection depends on 
observable factors only, which in turn means that the researcher has to observe every relevant 
factor that could affect the probability of receiving the treatment (Hussinger 2006); and it relies 
strongly on the existence of common support (Heckman et al. 1996 and 1997). 
 
Because the matching method allows only for a binary treatment, we compare the 
results using a second method. Selection models take into account selection on either observable 
or unobservable variables. A characteristic of these models is the additive separability of the 
unobserved components. A failure of common support is not as big a problem as for the 
matching approach, although this method has the cost of assuming a functional form. 
In the empirical analysis, we first consider the full sample of firms that report knowing 
about the tax incentives (which includes firms not conducting R&D), and second, the subsample 
of only firms that perform R&D. We work with the full sample because we take into account 
firms’ R&D status in order to evaluate the inducement effect of tax incentives on firms that do 
not conduct R&D (Aerts and Czarnitzki 2006; González and Pazó 2006). If we judged only 
those that did, we could underestimate the treatment effect because we could not test whether or 
not a firm would have performed innovation activities without the incentives.   
In the matching method, we evaluate the effect of tax incentives on R&D technological 
effort ( ) for the firms that use them (treated group, A=1), and the potential outcome ( ) for 
the non-user firms (untreated group, A=0). The fundamental problem of causal inference is that 
it is impossible to observe the individual treatment effect. But, under some assumptions, we can 
estimate the average treatment effect for the sample. We calculate the average treatment effect 
on the treated as follows: 
1Y 0Y
)1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= AYEAYEAYYEATT    
 [1] 
And we estimate the average treatment effect on the untreated as follows: 
)0()0()0( 0101 =−===−= AYEAYEAYYEATC    
 [2] 
 To carry out the evaluation, we need to construct the counterfactual )1ˆ( 0 =AYE  in 
equation [1], that is, the R&D technological effort users would have made, on average, had they 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Under the weaker assumption of mean independence, which supposes that firms’ participation in the fiscal 
incentives system is random, we can estimate the output by simply averaging the treatment and non-treatment firms 
 
not taken advantage of the tax incentives, selecting from the non-user firms a control group in 
which the distribution of observed variables is as similar as possible to the distribution in the 
treated group.  We also need to construct the counterfactual )0ˆ( 1 =AYE in equation [2], that is, 
the R&D technological effort non-user firms would have made, on average, had they taken 
advantage of the tax incentives, selecting from the user firms the control group with the most 
similar distribution of observed variables.  
To construct the counterfactual, we assume that all relevant differences between user 
and non-user firms are captured by their observable characteristics, X. Then we select from the 
non-user (user) firms a control group in which the distribution of observed variables is as 
similar as possible to the distribution in the user (non-user) group. We use the propensity score 
(PS) proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1977) instead of the vector of the observable 
characteristics X as the matching argument. Rosembaum and Rubin (1977) define the propensity 
score as the conditional probability of using tax incentives [ { }xXAxp === 1Pr)( . They 
show that if the exposure to treatment is random within cells defined by X, it is also random 
within cells defined by the values of a synthetic measure p(x).  
After that, we pair each user firm with some group of “equivalent” non-user firms, and 
associate the R&D technological effort of the treated firms i,  with the weighted outcomes of 
their “neighbours” j in the untreated comparison group (A=0) to obtain [1]: 
iy
∑
=∈
=
0
ˆ
Aj
jiji ywy .        
 [3] 
And we pair each non-user firm with the group of “more similar” user firms, and associate the 
R&D technological effort of the untreated firms j,  with the weighted outcomes of their 
“neighbours” i in the treated comparison group (A=1) to obtain [2]: 
jy
∑
=∈
=
1
ˆ
Ai
ijij ywy .        
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Wooldridge 2001).  
 
 [4] 
ijw  and  [0,1] withjiw ∈ 1
10
== ∑∑
=∈=∈ AiAj
wjiwij  are the weighted controls in forming a 
comparison with the other groups, untreated and treated, respectively.  
We estimate two types of matching estimators to obtain the treatment effect for the 
treated (user) firms and the untreated (non-user) firms.10 First, we find the outcome of the most 
similar control unit, that is, nearest neighbour matching11
 { }{ }kiAkji ppppj −=− =∈ 0min:  )(1 jKwik ==     
 [5] 
to estimate the treatment effect on the treated firm i, and 
  { }{ }kjAkij ppppi −=− =∈ 1min:  )(1 iKw jk ==    
 [6] 
to estimate the treatment effect on the untreated firm j. 
 Second, we use a weighted average of the outcomes of the untreated (treated) firms 
where the weight given to untreated j (treated i) firms is in proportion to the nearness of the 
observable characteristics of i (j) and j (i) (this is Kernel-based matching)12
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 [7] 
to estimate the treatment effect for the treated firms i, and 
                                                          
10  See Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Smith (2000), 
Becker and Ichino (2002) and Smith and Todd (2004) for a discussion of different types of matching estimators.  
11 Nearest neighbour matching has been used in Czarnitzki (2001), Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), 
Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Kaiser (2004), Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier 
(2004), Lööf and Hesmati (2005), Czarnitzki and Licht (2005), Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2006), González and 
Pazó (2006), Herrera and Heijs (2006) and Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006). 
12 Kernel-based matching has been used by Czarnitzki and Fier (2003), Duguet (2004), Kaiser (2004), 
Ebersberger and Lehtoranta (2005), Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2005) and Busom (2006). 
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to estimate the treatment effect for the untreated firms  j. 
Finally, we consider the average difference between the actual and the estimated 
outcome (R&D technological effort) to be caused by the tax policy. To derive equations [1] and 
[2] we need two assumptions given the propensity score: first, the balancing property, that is, 
the balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score 
A  ⊥  X   p(X)        
 [9] 
where A shows the treatment status (using or not using the tax incentives); and second, the 
unconfoundedness assumption given the propensity score 
   ⊥   A  01,YY p(x).        
 [10] 
If the first assumption is satisfied, observations with the same propensity score must 
have the same distribution of observable characteristics independently of their treatment status 
(the second assumption). That is, for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is random; 
therefore, user and non-user firms should be on average observationally identical.  
We estimate the propensity score according to Becker and Ichino (2002),13 considering 
the normal cumulative distribution 
{ } ( ))(1Pr)( xXhFxXAxp =====  
where h(X) is a function of covariates with linear and higher order terms. We restrict the sample 
to common support; that is, we delete all the observations on user firms with probabilities larger 
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. Also, for both 
                                                          
13 The program pscore.ado proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002) estimates the propensity score and tests the 
balancing assumption.   
 
samples (the full sample and those firms that perform R&D and know about the tax incentives), 
we estimate separate propensity scores for larger firms (more than 200 employees) and for 
SMEs, to evaluate the effects on the outcome (R&D technological effort) by size. So we 
estimate in total six propensity scores, and then we calculate the average treatment effects on the 
treated firms using nearest neighbour and Kernel-based matching as well as the average 
treatment effects on the non-treated firms using nearest neighbour matching.14
 To estimate the propensity score we use a similar specification from Corchuelo and 
Martínez-Ros (2008), in which the dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the firm takes 
advantage of the tax incentives and 0 otherwise. The vector of the covariates includes variables 
classified in three groups. The first group considers binary variables for firms’ characteristics: 
size (D10-20, D21-50, D51-100, D101-200, D201-500, D>500, with value 1 if the firm is in the 
given interval of number of employees), to take into account management abilities (Czarnitzki 
and Fier 2002; González and Pazó 2006); sector (DM-HS, with value 1 if the firm is in a high-
medium tech sector), to capture technological opportunities; and a financial variable (financial 
stability, with value 1 if the firm’s own equity over total debt is >0.5 and 0 otherwise), to 
account for differences in the way that firms finance their investment activities (Harhoff 1998; 
Hall 2002 and 2005).  
The second group includes binary variables linked with firms’ innovation activities: 
stable R&D firm, with value 1 if the firm has performed R&D activities in the period 1998-
2000, and 0 if it has not performed R&D activities or has done so in only some of those years, 
to show the experience of the firms (Busom 2000; Blanes and Busom 2004); and receive 
subsidies in 2002 to take into account that firms that participate in this type of program are also 
aware of other kinds of public support and have perfectly identified the R&D expenditures that 
qualify for the deductions. 
Finally, we have considered some variables that assume that firms evaluate costs and 
benefits before choosing to take advantage of the tax incentives. The benefits are approximated 
                                                          
14 We employ the method described in Becker and Ichino (2002) and Abadie and Imbens (2004). 
 
by the variable B-index,15 which represents the minimum profit that one firm expects to obtain 
from investing in R&D, allowing for tax incentives.16 The costs are approximated by two binary 
variables that reveal the obstacles perceived by managers to using tax incentives: lack of R&D 
personnel, with value 1 if the firm did not dedicate any personnel to R&D in 2002; and lack of 
importance of quality improvements in production, with value 1 if the firm does not perform 
quality controls, quality is not the principal reason for price variation, the firm does not perform 
market and marketing research to commercialise its product, and the firm has no design 
activities, and 0 otherwise. 
We test17 that the variables B-index and receive subsidies in 2002 are endogenous, and 
we use instrumental variables to take the endogeneity into account. Therefore, we include in the 
regressions the variable B-index for the previous year, and we use the estimated probability of 
the variable receive subsidies in 2002 (a binary variable with value 1 if the firm obtained an 
R&D subsidy in 2002) with a set of covariates.18  
Finally, the predicted probabilities (the so-called propensity scores) obtained from the 
probit models serve as argument in the matching procedure.  
Results from this method are compared with results from a two-step Heckman’s 
selection model in which, in a first step, we analyse the probability of using the tax incentives, 
and second, we analyse technological effort as a function of a set of variables that includes the 
B-index (expected profitability) that firms expect to obtain by participating in the tax incentive 
system.  
           
V. Empirical results 
1. Probability of using tax incentives 
                                                          
15 The B-index is a synthetic index designed by McFetridge and Warda (1983) that allows comparing the 
generosity of different systems of fiscal incentives for R&D. It is also the fiscal component of the cost of capital of a 
marginal project of R&D. 
16 The variable B-index has been elaborated in a similar way of Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2008). 
17 We use the Blundell and Smith test for probit models to check for the potential endogeneity of these variables. 
Under the alternative hypothesis, we regress the suspected endogenous variables as a linear projection of a set of 
instruments. We then include the residuals obtained in the model and, under the null hypothesis, exogeneity can be 
rejected, so we test the endogeneity of the variables.  
18 See and Martínez-Ros (2008) for details about the model used. 
 
First, we have estimated the predicted probability of using the tax incentives for the full sample 
(Table 4) and the sample of firms performing R&D (Table 5). In all the specifications, we have 
verified that the balancing property is satisfied.19  
The participation probability increases with firm size when the full sample is 
considered, but not when we restrict the sample to those firms performing R&D. Technological 
opportunities are not significant in either the full sample or the subsample of innovative firms. 
One important factor in explaining the probability of using tax incentives is to obtain R&D 
subsidies. Firms that apply for R&D subsidies have perfectly identified the qualified 
expenditures and can support the administrative or other costs of applying for them, so, as 
expected, this factor influences the use of the tax incentives system. This result shows 
complementarities among the public instruments to promote innovation. Financial stability also 
increases the probability of participation, but it is significant only to SMEs showing the 
importance of not having financial constraints to investing in R&D. In contrast, although being 
a stable R&D performer increases, in general, the probability of participation, it is significant 
only in large firms, which shows that firms with higher capacity to innovate are also more likely 
to use tax incentives. Finally, results report that only large firms are aware of the benefits from 
the tax incentives, while SMEs emphasize on the obstacles to using them.  
 In sum, those Spanish firms that have higher capacity for innovation (Czarnitzki et al. 
2004), participate in other types of public financing of innovation activities and have a stable 
financing position are more likely to take advantage of tax incentives for R&D.  
2. Average treatment effects 
Second, we present the average treatment effect on treated firms and the average treatment 
effect on untreated firms using different types of matching estimators. We have tested the full 
sample of firms knowing tax incentives (Table 6) and the subsample of firms that know about 
the tax incentives and perform R&D (Table 7), distinguishing by size. The first two rows show 
nearest neighbour matching (random draw version) and the Kernel matching proposed by 
                                                          
19   Upon request, the authors will provide the number of blocks that ensures that the mean propensity score is not 
different for treated firms and control firms in each block (guaranteeing that the balancing property is satisfied) and 
 
Becker and Ichino (2002), and the rest of the rows show the sample average effect of treatment 
on treated firms (SATT) and the sample average effect of treatment on controls (SATC) using 
the nearest neighbour estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2004). Effect tests are usually 
carried out by means of simple t-statistics. However, the ordinary t-value is biased upwards 
because it does not capture that the mean of the outcome variable of the control group results 
not from a random sampling but from an estimation (via the propensity score and the matching 
procedure). To remove this bias, we apply a bootstrapping method that simulates the 
distribution of the mean outcome of the control group by repeated sampling. This empirical 
distribution can calculate a standard error and, thus, a t-statistic that is not biased. On the other 
hand, Smith (2000) considers that the nearest neighbour estimator can operate with more than 
one “nearest neighbour,” and with or without replacement, that is, the untreated firm can act as 
counterfactual of more than one treated firm. This way, we can reduce the variance of the 
estimator (Smith and Todd, 2004), since the observations with insufficient “nearest neighbours” 
are ignored and the group of possible matching firms is larger and this can reduce biases 
(Abadie and Imbens 2006).   
In Table 6 we observe that only the SATT procedure presents a positive and significant 
effect of tax incentives on R&D technological effort, either for the full sample or for any group 
of firms by size. Comparatively, the effect is higher in SMEs. However, the effect that tax 
incentives would have on non-user firms is not significant.  
When only firms that conduct R&D are considered (Table 7), the positive and 
significant effect of tax incentives exists only in large firms. This result supports the idea that 
only large firms are aware of the benefits of the incentives and that SMEs, in contrast, perceive 
some obstacles that impede their access to these incentives. The hypothetical effect that tax 
incentives would have on non-users is positive and significant in the full sample of innovative 
firms: R&D technological effort could be increased if more firms took advantage of tax 
incentives. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the number of treated firms and control firms for each block considering the common support (the table that shows 
the inferior block of the propensity score).  
 
 Finally, we present the results of the second step of Heckman’s procedure (the structural 
equation) in Tables 8 and 9. The dependent variable in the regressions is the log of R&D 
technological effort, and we have used the log of B-index as an independent variable to obtain 
the elasticity of R&D effort due to the tax benefits. Results are similar to those from the 
matching procedure. Only the coefficients of the technological opportunities and B-index 
variables are significant and have the correct sign. R&D technological effort increases in high-
tech firms and when the B-index is minor, but the former effect is significant only in large 
firms. Parametric estimation shows that only large firms and firms in high-tech industries seem 
to benefit from the tax incentives, and for those firms the tax policy is effective. As well, the 
Mill’s ratio is not significant in SMEs, which shows that there is not a selection problem and 
that tax incentives are randomly distributed in firms of this size.  
VI. Conclusions 
Fiscal incentives for R&D are instruments used by governments to encourage 
innovation. Spain’s tax policy is considered the most favourable among the OECD 
countries, but data report that it is little used by firms. To explore the effectiveness of 
these incentives, we have used both parametric (matching estimators) and 
nonparametric (selection model) approaches on a sample of Spanish manufacturing 
firms.  
There are two main findings in our paper. (1) Among firms that perform R&D activities, 
size per se does not affect the probability of using tax incentives, but they are used especially by 
large firms that can guarantee the viability of the projects and those that are more heavily 
involved in innovation activities. Moreover, tax incentives are also employed by firms that 
receive additional public financial support (direct subsidies) for R&D investment, in particular, 
small and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs]. Only large firms evaluate the estimated returns 
caused by the tax incentives. We also find that the obstacles are important especially for SMEs. 
(2) In the estimation of the counterfactual situation, we show that on average tax policy fosters 
R&D technological effort, but the increase is significant only for large firms. We consider that, 
 
in the case of SMEs, a reduction of the obstacles might increase their probability of 
implementing innovations and therefore increasing their R&D spending. Finally, results of the 
structural equation in the Heckman’s selection model confirm that the tax policy has a 
significant and great effect only in large firms.  
Our main conclusion is that in Spain, tax incentives for innovation are effective 
only in high-medium tech sectors and large firms and those incentives do not have 
impact on SMEs, where the incentives are randomly distributed. 
 
References 
Abadie, A., Drukker, D., Leber Herr, J. and Imbens G.W. (2004). Implementing 
matching estimators for average treatment effects in Stata. The Stata Journal, 4(3), 
290-311. 
Abadie, A., Imbens, G.W. (2005). On the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators. 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/bootstrap.pdf
Abadie, A., Imbens, G.W. (2006). Large sample properties of matching estimators for average 
treatment effects. Econometrica, 74 (1), 235-267. 
Aerts, K., Czarnitzki, D. (2005). Using innovation survey data to evaluate R&D policy: the case 
of Flanders.  ZEW Discussion Paper, n. 04-55. 
Almus, S., Czarnitzki, D. (2003). The effects of public R&D subsidies on firm’s innovation 
activities: the case of Eastern Germany.  Journal of Economic Statistics, 21(1), 226-236. 
Arrow, K. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions. In R. 
Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press. 
Asmussen, R., Berriot, C. (1993). Le credit d-impot recherche, cout et effet incitatif. Ministere 
de l’Economie et des Finances, París. 
Becker, S., Ichino, A. (2002). Estimation for average treatment effects based on propensity 
scores.  The Stata Journal, 2(4), 358-377. 
Berger, P. (1993). Explicit and implicit tax effects of the R&D tax credit. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 31(2). 
 
Blanes, J.V. , Busom, I. (2004). Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of 
Spanish manufacturing firms. Research Policy,  33, 1459-1476. 
Bloom, N., Griffith, R., Van Reenen, J. (2002). Do R&D credits work? Evidence from an 
international panel of countries 1979-1997. Journal of Public Economics, 85,  1-31. 
Busom, I. (2000). An empirical evaluation of the effects of R&D subsidies. Economics of 
innovation and New Technologies,  9, 111-148. 
European Commission (2003). Raising EU R&D Intensity. Improving the Effectiveness of 
Public Support Mechanism for Private Sector Research and Development: Fiscal Measures. 
EUR 20714, DG for Research Knowledge Based Society and Economy Strategy and Policy, 
Investment in Research, Luxemburgo. 
Corchuelo, M.B. (2006). Incentivos fiscales en I+D y decisiones de innovación. Revista de 
Economía Aplicada, XIV (40), 5-34. 
Corchuelo, M.B., Martínez-Ros, E.  (2008). Aplicación de los incentivos fiscales a la inversión 
en I+D en las empresas españolas, Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía 
Aplicada, 187-(4/2008), 9-39. 
Czarnitzki, D., Fier A. (2002). Do innovation subsidies crowded out private investment: 
evidence from the German service sector. Applied Economics Quarterly, 48(1), 1-25. 
Czarnitzki, D., Hanel, P., Rosa, J.M. (2004). Evaluating the impact of R&D tax credit on 
innovation: A microeconometric study on Canadian firms. ZEW Discussion Paper Nº. 04-
77. 
David, P.A., Hall, B.H., Toole A.A. (2000). Is public R&D a complement or substitute for 
private R&D? A review of the econometric evidence. Research Policy,  29, 497-529. 
Dehejia, R., Wahba, S. (1999). Casual effects in nonexperimental studies: reevaluating the 
evaluation of training programmes.  Journal of the American Statistical Association. 
Dehejia, R., Wahba, S. (2002). Propensity Score-Matching methods for nonexperimental casual 
studies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 151-161. 
 
Department of Finance Canada and Revenue Canada (1998). Evaluation report: The Federal 
system of income tax incentives for scientific research and experimental development. 
Ottawa. 
Duch, N., Montolia, D., Mediavilla, M. (2007). Evaluation of public subsidies oriented to firm’s 
performance: a quasi-experimental approach. Instituto D’Economia de Barcelona, Working 
Paper 2007/3. 
Duguet, E. (2004). Are R&D subsidies a substitute or a complement to privately funded R&D? 
Evidence from France using propensity score methods for non-experimental data. Review 
d’Economie Politique, 114 (2), 263-292. 
Ebersberger, B., Lehtoranta (2005). Pattern of innovative activities among Finnish firms. VTT 
Publications, 558. 
Falk, M. (2004). European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D: Evidence from 
OECD country and industry-level data, background report for the European 
Competitiveness Report 2004. 
Fariñas, J.C., Jaumandreu, J. (1999). Diez años de Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales 
(ESEE).  Economía Industrial, 329, 29-42. 
Fier, A. (2002), Technology policy and business innovation activities in the case of Germany. In 
Gretzmacher, N., G. Hutschenreiter y W. Polt (eds.), Proceedings of the tip workshop: 
Changing Strategies for Business R&D and their implications for Science and Technology 
(pp.54-67). 
González, X., Pazó, C. (2005). Do public subsidies stimulate private R&D spending?. 
Documentos de Traballo 0601, Universidad of Vigo. 
Guellec, D., Van Pottlesberghe, B. (2003). The impact of public R&D expenditure on business 
R&D.  Economics of Innovation and New Technologies, 12(3), 225-244. 
Gupta, S.,, Hwang, Y., Schmidt, A. (2004). R&D spending fools? An analysis of the R&D 
credit’s incentive effects after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. Working 
Paper. 
 
Hall, B. (1993). R&D tax policy during the 1980s: success or failure. Tax Policy and the 
Economy, 7, 1-35. 
Hall, B.H. (2002). The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 18(1), 35-51. 
Hall, B.H., Van Reenen, J. (2000). How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review of 
the evidence.  Research Policy, 29, 449-469. 
Hanel, P. (2003). Impact of Government support programs on innovation by Canadian 
manufacturing firms. Note de Recherche 2003-09, CIRST: Centre Interuniversitaire de 
recherche sur la science et la technologie (CIRST). 
Harhoff, D. (1998). Are the financing constraints for R&D investment in German 
manufacturing firms?. Annales D’Économie et de Statistique, 49/50, 421-456. 
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Todd, P. (1997). Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: 
evidence from evaluating a job training program. Review of Economic Studies, 64 (5), 605-
664. 
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Todd, P. (1998). Characterizing selection bias using experimental 
data.  Econometrica,66 (5), 1017-1098. 
Heckman, J., LaLonde, R., Smith, J. (1999). The economics and econometrics of active labour 
market programme. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds.), The Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol. III. 
Herrera, L. (2004). Efecto de la política de estímulo a la innovación sobre la actividad 
innovadora de las empresas. Universidad de León. 
Hotz, V.J., Imbens, G.W., Klerman, J.A. (2006). Evaluating the differential effects of alternative 
welfare-to-work training components: a re-analysis of the Californian GAIN program. 
NBER Working Paper nº. 11939. 
Kaiser, U. (2004). Private R&D and public subsidies: microeconomic evidence from Denmark. 
Center for Economic and Business Research, DP 2004-19. 
 
Klassen, K.J., Pittman, J.A., Reed, M.P. (2003). A cross-national comparison of R&D 
decisions: tax incentives and financial constraints. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
21(3), 639-684. 
Lattimore, R. (1997). Research and Development Fiscal Incentives in Australia: Impacts and 
Policy Lessons. Industry Commission. 
Lechner, M. (2002). Some practical issues in the evaluation of heterogeneous labour market 
programmes by matching methods. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Serie A 
(Statistics in Society), 165,  59. 
Lööf, H., Hesmati, A. (2005). Additionality or crowding out? On the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies. The Royal Institute of Technology. Centre of Excellence for Studies in Science 
and Innovation.  
Donald, C. (2004). R&D tax incentives: a comparison of the incentive effects of refundable and 
non-refundable tax credit.  Summer Research Paper. University of Waterloo. 
Mansfield, E. (1986). The R&D tax credit and other technology policy issues. American 
Economic Review, 76 (2), 190-194. 
Marra, M.A. (2004). Incentivos fiscales, inversión en actividades de I+D y estructura de costes. 
Un análisis por tamaño para una muestra representativa de empresas manufactureras 
españolas 1991-1999. Hacienda Pública Española/ Revista de Economía Pública, 170-
(3/2004), 9-35. 
Mc Fetridge, D.G., Warda, J.P. (1983). Canadian R&D Tax Incentives: Their Adequacy and 
Impact. Canadian Tax Paper, 70. Toronto: Canadian Tax foundation. 
Nelson, R. (1959). The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of Political 
Economy, 76, 297-306. 
Parisi, M.L., Sembenelli, A. (2003), Is private R&D spending sensitive to its price? Empirical 
evidence on panel data for Italy. Empirica,  4.  
Sianesi, B. (2001). Implementing propensity score matching estimators with Stata. 
 http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePec/usug2001/psmatch.pdf
 
Van Pottlesberghe, B., Megally, E., Nysten, S. (2003). Evaluation of current fiscal incentives for 
business R&D in Belgium. Working Paper CEB 011. Solvay Business School, Universite 
Libre de Bruxelles.  
Warda, J. (2001). Measuring the value of R&D tax treatment in OECD countries. In SIT 
Review, 27, 185-211. 
Warda, J. (2002). A 2001-2002 update of R&D tax treatment in OECD countries. Paper 
prepared for the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Ma. 
 
 TABLE 1 
Firms That Know about and Use R&D Tax Incentives, by Size (2002) 
Full sample 
 Do not know Know Use 
 Observations % total Observations % total Observations % 
Know 
SMEs 610 52.1 560 47.9 102 18.2 
Large firms 87 16.2 451 83.8 191 42.4 
Total 697 40.8 1,011 59.2 293 29.0 
Firms that conduct R&D  
 Observations % total Observations % total Observations % 
Know 
SMEs 62 25.6 180 74.4 82 45.6 
Large firms 41 10.3 357 89.7 177 49.6 
Total 103 16.1 537 83.9 259 48.2 
Source: ESEE and own elaboration 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Firms That Know about  and Use R&D Tax Incentives by Sector (2002) 
 
Full sample 
 Do not know Know Use 
 Observations % total Observations % total Observations % 
Know 
Medium-low 
tech 
93 26.4 259 73.6 110 42.5 
High-medium 
tech 
604 44.5 752 55.5 183 24.3 
Total 697 40.8 1,011 59.2 293 29.0 
Firms that conduct R&D 
 Observations % total Observations % total Observations % 
Know 
Medium-low 
tech 
25 11.7 188 88.3 106 56.4 
High-medium 
tech 
78 18.3 349 81.7 153 43.8 
Total 103 16.1 537 83.9 259 48.2 
Source: ESEE and own elaboration 
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
R&D Technological Effort of Firms That Conduct R&D (2002) 
 
  Do not know Know Use
SMEs 1.5 2.3 3.0 
Large firms 0.8 1.6 2.2 
Total 1.2 1.9 2.5 
 
    Source: ESEE and own elaboration 
 
TABLE 4  
Probability of Using Tax Incentives, among Firms That Know about Them  
[Dependent variable: claim R&D deductions] 
 
 Total  SMEs  Large 
Const. 
 
D21-50*
 
D51-100*
 
D101-200*
 
D201-500*
 
D> 500*
 
DM-HS* 
 
Financial stability* 
 
Stable R&D firm* 
 
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002) 
 
1
ˆ −− tindexB  
 
Lack of R&D personnel* 
 
Importance of quality improvements in 
production* 
-1.80 (-5.4) 
 
0.71 (2.4) 
 
0.69 (2.1) 
 
1.04 (3.4) 
 
0.94 (3.1) 
 
0.72 (2.4) 
 
0.11 (1.0) 
 
0.30 (3.0) 
 
0.62 (3.9) 
 
0.69 (3.0) 
 
0.65 (2.3) 
 
-0.49 (-3.1) 
 
 
-0.40 (-3.1) 
 
-0.9 (-3.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 (0.4) 
 
0.43 (2.9) 
 
0.45 (1.8) 
 
1.73 (2.8) 
 
0.57 (1.0) 
 
-0.80 (-3.2) 
 
 
-0.48 (-2.5) 
 
-0.9 (-3.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 (0.5) 
 
0.21 (1.5) 
 
0.66 (3.2) 
 
0.51 (2.0) 
 
0.72 (2.2) 
 
-0.38 (-1.8) 
 
 
-0.34 (-1,8) 
 
Number of obs. 
Log-likelihood 
Region of common support 
 
914 
-409.1 
[0.018, 0.92] 
518 
-181.9 
[0.023,0.96] 
  
396 
-231.33 
[0.111,0.83] 
 
 
TABLE 5 
 
Probability of Using Tax Incentives, among Firms That Conduct R&D and Know about the 
Incentives 
[Dependent variable: claim R&D deductions] 
 
 Total  SMEs  Large 
Const. 
 
D21-50* 
 
D51-100* 
 
D101-200* 
 
D201-500* 
 
D> 500* 
 
DM-HS* 
 
Financial stability* 
 
Stable R&D firm* 
 
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002) 
 
1
ˆ −− tindexB  
 
Lack of R&D personnel* 
 
Importance of quality improvements in 
production* 
-1.30 (-2.7) 
 
0.72 (1.5) 
 
0.88 (1.7) 
 
0.91 (1.8) 
 
0.81 (1.7) 
 
0.56 (1.1) 
 
0.23 (1.7) 
 
0.26 (2.2) 
 
- 
 
0.81 (3.5) 
 
0.79 (2.7) 
 
-0.42 (-2.1) 
 
 
-0.31 (-1.9) 
 
-0.80 (-2.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.27 (1.1) 
 
0.47 (2.2) 
 
0.13 (0.5) 
 
1.55 (2.4) 
 
0.73 (1.2) 
 
-0.05 (-0.2) 
 
 
-0.46 (-1.8) 
 
-1.10 (-3.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.09 (0.6) 
 
0.14 (0.9) 
 
0.80 (3.4) 
 
0.52 (2.0) 
 
0.75 (2.2) 
 
-0.63 (-2.3) 
 
 
-0.19 (-0,8) 
 
Number of obs. 
Log-likelihood 
Region of common support 
 
487 
-307.2 
[0.120, 0.92] 
171 
-101.9 
[0.169,0.97] 
  
316 
-194.6 
[0.062,0.83] 
 
 
TABLE 6 
 
Matching Estimators: Firms that Know about the Tax Incentives 
 
 Total SMEs Large 
ATT (NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
0.35 (0.9)(1) 
283 
149 
0.56 (0.9) (1) 
101 
61 
0.84 (2.3) (1) 
182 
84 
ATT (Kernel) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
0.76 (3.2) (1)
283 
149 
0.53 (1.2) (1) 
101 
390 
0.74 (2.6) 
182 
188 
SATT 
(NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
Percent of exact matching 
Number of matches 
0.67 (2.6) 
 
283 
615 
100 
4 
0.87 (2.1) 
 
101 
417 
100 
4 
0.68 (2.3) 
 
182 
198 
100 
4 
SATC 
(NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
Percent of exact matching 
Number of matches 
0.23 (1.1) 
 
615 
283 
100 
4 
0.16 (0.7) 
 
417 
101 
100 
4 
0.33 (1.2) 
 
198 
182 
100 
4 
Note: (1) Bootstrap standard errors (n. reps: 100) 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
 
Matching Estimators: Firms that Conduct R&D and Know about the Tax Incentives  
 
 Total SMEs Large 
ATT (NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
0.12 (0.3)(1) 
249 
114 
0.47 (0.8) (1) 
81 
42 
0.68 (1.8) (1) 
168 
77 
ATT (Kernel) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
0.75 (2.6) (1)
249 
231 
0.63 (1.1) (1) 
81 
85 
0.79 (2.6) 
168 
142 
SATT 
(NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
Percent of exact matching 
Number of matches 
0.84 (2.6) 
 
249 
220 
100 
4 
0.76 (1.2) 
 
81 
87 
100 
4 
0.82 (2.3) 
 
182 
131 
100 
4 
SATC 
(NNM) 
N. Treated 
N. Controls 
Percent of exact matching 
Number of matches 
0.59 (2.0) 
 
220 
249 
100 
4 
0.71 (1.3) 
 
87 
81 
100 
4 
0.44 (1.2) 
 
131 
168 
100 
4 
Note: (1) Bootstrap standard errors (n. reps: 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Heckman’s Second Step (Structural Equation). Firms that Know about the Tax Incentives  
[Dependent variable: log (R&D technological effort)] 
. 
 Total  SMEs  Large 
D21-50* 
 
D51-100* 
 
D101-200* 
 
D201-500* 
 
D> 500* 
 
DM-HS* 
 
Financial stability* 
 
Stable R&D firm* 
 
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002) 
 
Ln( ) 1ˆ −− tindexB
 
Mill’s ratio 
0.51 (0.9) 
 
-0.09 (-0.2) 
 
-0.33 (-0.6) 
 
-0.60 (-1.2) 
 
-0.72 (-1.2) 
 
0.79 (4.2) 
 
-0.18 (-1.0) 
 
0.43 (1,2) 
 
0.63 (2.0) 
 
-0.43 (-2.1) 
 
-0.97 (-3.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.70 (2.2) 
 
-0.48 (-1.6) 
 
0.51 (1.7) 
 
0.75 (1.2) 
 
-0.18 (-0.6) 
 
-0.60 (-2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.78 (3.0) 
 
-0.08 (-0.4) 
 
0.06 (0.2) 
 
0.40 (1.0) 
 
-0.78 (-2.4) 
 
-1.71 (-5.2) 
 
Number of obs. 
Wald chi (free degrees) 
 
 
243 
134.8(19) 
81 
56.0(9) 
  
162 
63.9(9) 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Heckman’s Second Step (Structural Equation). Firms that Conduct R&D and Know about the 
Tax Incentives 
[Dependent variable: log (R&D technological effort] 
 
 Total  SMEs  Large 
D21-50* 
 
D51-100* 
 
D101-200* 
 
D201-500* 
 
D> 500* 
 
DM-HS* 
 
Financial stability* 
 
Stable R&D firm* 
 
Pˆ (receive subsidies in 2002) 
 
Ln( ) 1ˆ −− tindexB
 
Mill’s ratio 
0.30 (0.6) 
 
-0.22 (-0.3) 
 
-0.41 (-0.7) 
 
-0.64 (-1.0) 
 
-0.7 (-1.0) 
 
0.75 (3.7) 
 
-0.23 (-1.2) 
 
0.71 (2.0) 
 
0.49 (1.3) 
 
-0.49 (-2.0) 
 
-1.28 (-2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.67 (2.0) 
 
-0.54 (-1.7) 
 
0.71 (2.0) 
 
0.67 (1.0) 
 
-0.02 (-0.1) 
 
-0.56 (-1.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.77 (2.6) 
 
-0.09 (-0.4) 
 
0.25 (0.8) 
 
0.32 (0.7) 
 
-0.89 (-2.3) 
 
-2.02 (-4.5) 
 
Number of obs. 
Wald chi (free degrees) 
 
 
243 
104.0(19) 
81 
42.2(9) 
  
162 
47.3(9) 
 
TABLE A.1 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Total  Firms That Perform 
R&D 
Firms That Know 
Incentives 
Variables 
Media s.d. Media s.d. Media s.d. 
D10-20* 
 
D21-50* 
 
D51-100* 
 
D101-200* 
 
D201-500* 
 
D > 500* 
 
DM-HS* 
 
Financial stability >0.5* 
 
Stable R&D firms* 
 
Receive R&D subsidies in 2002* 
 
B-index  (1) 1−t
 
Lack of R&D personnel * 
 
Importance of quality 
improvements in production* 
 
R&D technological effort 
0.22 
 
0.27 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
0.20 
 
0.12 
 
0.21 
 
0.38 
 
0.30 
 
0.09 
 
0.41 
 
0.68 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.41 
 
0.44 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.40 
 
0.32 
 
0.41 
 
0.48 
 
0.46 
 
0.29 
 
0.14 
 
0.47 
 
 
0.50 
 
0.04 
 
0.13 
 
0.08 
 
0.12 
 
0.38 
 
0.25 
 
0.33 
 
0.41 
 
0.81 
 
0.25 
 
0.45 
 
0.14 
 
 
0.17 
 
0.19 
 
0.34 
 
0.28 
 
0.32 
 
0.48 
 
0.43 
 
0.47 
 
0.49 
 
0.40 
 
0.44 
 
0.21 
 
0.35 
 
 
0.38 
 
0.12 
 
0.21 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.27 
 
0.18 
 
0.25 
 
0.41 
 
0.44 
 
0.15 
 
0.42 
 
0.53 
 
 
0.31 
 
0.32 
 
0.41 
 
0.30 
 
0.33 
 
0.44 
 
0.38 
 
0.44 
 
0.49 
 
0.50 
 
0.36 
 
0.17 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.46 
 
Note: In parenthesis, percentages over the total. 
 
  
 
 
 
